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Executive summary
Defence as a political issue
Defence was the tenth most important 
election issue for voters at the 2007 election. 
Around 1 in 6 voters mentioned some aspect of 
defence—security, the Iraq war or terrorism—
as their first or second most important issue in 
the election. Twice as many voters mentioned 
defence as an important issue than did so 
10 years ago.
In 2007, Labor substantially made up its 
long-running disadvantage on these issues 
compared to the Liberal–National Coalition. 
It remained slightly behind the Coalition as 
the preferred party on defence and national 
security and on terrorism, but was substantially 
ahead of the Coalition as the preferred party 
on the Iraq war.
Public confidence in defence
Around one quarter of voters believe that 
Australia could defend itself if attacked, 
but a majority consistently see defence 
as having become stronger than it was 
10 years previously.
Public support for greater defence spending 
peaked twice over the past 30 years—in 1980 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
and following East Timor in 2000 and 9/11 in 
2001. Since then, support for more defence 
spending has dropped to its lowest level since 
the end of the Cold War.
Security threats
The proportion of voters seeing a security 
threat to Australia has declined consistently 
since the late 1960s.
Indonesia is by far the most frequently 
mentioned potential threat to Australia’s 
security and is mentioned by 28% of voters, a 
number that has remained relatively constant 
for the past 10 years. Next is China, which is 
seen as a threat by 10% of voters.
Defence and the United States
Public support for defence links with the 
US has remained consistently high over an 
extended period. There has been recent decline 
in support, caused by the unpopularity of the 
2004 Free Trade Agreement and the Iraq war. 
There is a strong generational element to 
support for the US: those who remember 
and had direct experience of US support for 
Australia in the Second World War being most 
in favour. There is strong support for continued 
Australian military assistance to the War on 
Terror, despite the decline in support since 2001.
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Terrorism
The threat of terrorism is now regarded by 
almost 2 in 3 people as part of everyday life 
in Australia, and half of those are concerned 
about becoming the victim of a terrorist attack. 
Two-thirds of people surveyed, are concerned 
about a major attack in the future.
There is strong support for restricting the legal 
rights of terrorist sympathisers. The public’s 
concern about a general terrorist attack in 
Australia is the most important factor shaping 
these opinions.
Introduction
For the majority of Australians, issues relating 
to defence and national security represent 
second order concerns, overshadowed 
in importance by more immediate socio­
economic issues such as health, education 
and the performance of the economy. The 
way in which defence and security have been 
framed in the public’s mind was underpinned 
in the 1980s and 1990s by an informal 
bipartisan consensus that defence should 
not become a highly contested political 
issue. Defence and security issues were only 
debated in very general terms during this 
period. There was also broad support for the 
main goals of defence policy, regardless of 
which party occupied government.
Several factors have served to bring defence 
and security into sharper relief for the public. 
Most obviously, the spectre of terrorism 
following the 9/11 attacks in the United States 
and the 2002 Bali bombings heightened the 
public’s awareness of the potential threats 
that exist from Islamist terrorism. Second, 
and related to terrorism, there is now a 
widespread recognition that the increasingly 
global nature of terrorism has undermined 
the territorial integrity of the nation state. 
And third, partisan divisions over participation 
in and the conduct of the Iraq war have 
made voters more aware of the arguments 
surrounding defence policy.
The purpose of this report is to trace the 
public’s changing views of the main issues 
relating to defence and security over an 
extended period—in some cases stretching 
back to the late 1960s. The report updates and 
extends two previous ASPI reports, Attitude 
Matters: Public opinion in Australia towards 
defence and security and Representative Views: 
Mass and elite opinion on Australian security 
(McAllister, 2004, 2005). The reports are 
updated using the 2004 and 2007 Australian 
Election Study surveys, and a new analysis 
is conducted on public opinion concerning 
terrorism. As in the previous reports, the 
data comes principally from the 1987–2007 
Australian Election Study (AES) surveys. Full 
details of the surveys and other technical 
details are provided in the Appendix. 
Defence as a political issue
From the withdrawal of Australian troops 
from Vietnam in 1973 until the 11 September 
2001 attacks in the United States, defence 
rarely rated as an issue with the general 
public. Throughout this period, there 
was very limited Australian military 
involvement overseas, with the partial 
exceptions of the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 
deployment in East Timor. There was also 
a generally­recognised consensus among 
the political elite that defence and security 
should not become a partisan political 
issue. Following the 9/11 attacks in the 
United States, the Bali bombings in October 
2002, and a generally heightened awareness 
of the potential threat from Islamist terrorism, 
defence has, for the first time in three 
decades, rated as an issue that the public is 
concerned about. In turn, that awareness 
has stimulated a greater public debate about 
defence issues and priorities.
Public opinion in Australia towards defence, security and terrorism 
In the 2007 federal election, the Australian 
Election Study survey found that defence 
and national security rated tenth from a list 
of 14 issues, along with taxation, just behind 
immigration and ahead of unemployment. 
The results in Table 1 show that about 1 in 20 
voters rated it as either their first or second 
most important election issue. If we combine 
the three defence­related issues included in 
the survey—defence and national security, 
the Iraq war and terrorism—a total of 17% 
of voters rated some aspect of defence and 
security as their first priority in the election. 
The top­rated issues in the election were 
health and medicare, which was mentioned 
by 37% of voters as a first or second priority, 
followed by industrial relations, which was 
mentioned by a total of 24%. The third most 
important set of issues were concerned with 
the environment, notably the management 
of water resources and the problem of 
global warming. 
The importance of defence in the 2007 
election represents a marginal decline from 
2004. Figure 1 shows that in 2004, 54% of 
voters said that defence was ‘extremely 
important’ as an election issue, compared to 
40% in 2007. However, this still represents 
a substantial increase on the 25% of voters 
who mentioned it as an issue in 1996 (the 
option was not given in the 1998 survey). 
To that extent, and barring future security 
crises, defence may have peaked as a major 
political issue for voters. The most substantial 
increase in public concern in recent elections 
has been over the environment. In the 1990 
federal election the environment jumped 
in importance as an issue, from 26% in 1987 
to double that figure in 1990. It declined 
in importance in subsequent elections, 
but again reached 52% in 2004 and an 
unprecedented 59% in 2007. The other major 
trends have been the continuing decline in 
concern about taxation and unemployment, 
Table 1: How the issues rated in the 2007 federal election
Mentions
Rank Issue First Second
1. Health, medicare 20.5 16.5
2. Industrial relations 16.3 8.0
3. Taxation 11.0 7.2
4. Education 10.5 13.7
5. Environment 7.7 10.3
6. Global warming 7.4 9.1
7. Interest rates 7.0 6.3
8. Management of water 6.6 9.6
9. Immigration 2.9 4.0
10. Defence, national security 2.7 2.7
11. War in Iraq 2.4 3.0
12. Unemployment 2.2 2.7
13. Terrorism 1.8 4.2
14. Treatment of aborigines 0.9 2.9
Total 100 100
(N) (1,796) (1,755)
‘Still thinking about these same 14 issues, which of these issues was most important to you during the election 
campaign? And which next?’
Source: AES 2007.
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both major issues in the election held during 
the 1990s, and the continuing dominance 
of health as an issue, which was seen as 
extremely important by 76% of voters in both 
the 2004 and 2007 elections (for full details of 
all issues, see McAllister and Clark, 2008).
There were clearly many factors that 
contributed to the Australian Labor Party’s 
2007 election success, but one was the party’s 
increasing credibility with voters on national 
security issues. In addition to asking voters to 
list their major concerns during the election, 
the AES also asked voters which party they 
saw as being most effective in dealing with 
these issues. Figure 2 shows the percent who 
preferred Labor policies on these issues minus 
the percent who preferred Liberal–National 
Coalition policies. In 1996, Labor had a modest 
disadvantage of 9 percentage points on 
defence and national security. However, in 
the 2001 and 2004 elections, the Coalition 
moved decisively ahead of Labor as the 
preferred party on defence and security. In 
part, this was a consequence of the Coalition’s 
incumbency during the period immediately 
following the 9/11 and the Bali terrorist 
attacks; the public largely approved of the 
Howard government’s handling of the policy 
responses to these critical issues. In part, 
too, the Coalition benefited from the public’s 
general preference for a conservative party to 
handle national security issues.
As a consequence, Labor trailed the 
Coalition in the 2001 and 2004 elections 
as the preferred party on defence and 
national security and on terrorism by 
Figure 1: Trends in opinion towards major election issues, 1987–2007  
(percent say ‘extremely important’)
1987: ‘Here is a list of issues that were discussed during the election campaign. When you were deciding about voting, 
how important was each of these issues to you?’ 1990–96: ‘Still thinking about these same (1990: nine) issues, when 
you were deciding about how to vote, how important was each of these issues to you personally?’ 1998–2007: ‘Here 
is a list of important issues that were discussed during the election campaign. When you were deciding how to vote, 
how important was each of these issues to you personally? In 1987 four response categories were used, 1990–2007, 
three categories. ‘Defence and national security’ was ‘defence’ in 1996. ‘Health and medicare’ was ‘health care’ in 1987 
and ‘health’ in 1990 and 1993.
Source: AES 1987–2007.
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between 23% and 29%—a very substantial 
disadvantage. The 2007 results show a 
major turnaround in public opinion. On both 
defence and terrorism, Labor improved its 
position by a substantial 20 percentage 
points; while it remained behind the Coalition 
as the preferred party on these issues, its 
disadvantage was small, and many more 
voters saw no difference between the 
major parties. Labor also benefited from the 
increasing unpopularity of the Iraq war and 
from its policy of withdrawing Australian 
troops from Iraq if elected; in 2004, the 
Coalition had an 11 point advantage on this 
issue, a situation that had reversed by 2007 
to became a Labor advantage of 19 points 
in 2007.1 
Although it was slightly less important as an 
election issue in the 2007 federal election 
compared to the previous 2004 election, 
defence remains a serious concern for voters, 
especially if the comparatively new issue of 
terrorism is included. Remaining as the major 
concern of voters was health, with industrial 
relations and the environment coming 
second and third, respectively. Perhaps the 
most significant change in 2007 compared 
to previous elections was Labor’s improved 
standing among voters as the preferred 
party to deal with these issues; while Labor 
still trailed the Coalition as the preferred 
party, its disadvantage was much reduced. 
Indeed, Labor was able to capitalise on the 
unpopularity of the Iraq war, with almost 
twice as many voters preferring Labor’s policy 
of withdrawal to the Coalition’s policy. If the 
2007 election is the beginning of a sustained 
period of Labor government, we might expect 
the incumbency advantage on these issues 
that once benefited the Coalition to shift 
towards Labor.
One further piece of evidence concerning the 
public’s view of defence is the extent to which 
defence and security are viewed as general 
Figure 2: Preferred party on defence issues, 1996–2007 (% Labor minus % Coalition)
‘Still thinking about these same issues, whose policies—the Labor Party’s or the Liberal–National Coalition’s—would 
you say come closer to your own views on each of these issues?’ Figures are the percent preferring Labor minus the 
percent preferring the Coalition.
Source: AES 1996–2007.
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problems facing Australia, as opposed to 
election issues. The distinction is important, 
because in elections voters tend to respond 
to the issues that party elites politicise 
rather than what they might regard as the 
most pressing problems facing the country. 
Some voters may view an issue as generally 
important, but not view it as significant in an 
election context. Figure 3 shows that there 
is a distinction, and defence and national 
security and the Iraq war are seen as more 
important election issues than problems 
facing Australia—reflecting their prominence 
in political debates. By contrast, terrorism is 
regarded more as a general problem facing 
Australia than an election issue. 
confidence in defence
Since the Second World War, Australia’s 
defence capacity has been viewed 
as dependent on support from the 
United States. Australia’s major overseas 
military commitments, notably in the Korean 
and Vietnam wars, took place as part of a 
US­led force. Even the East Timor deployment 
in 1999, while not directly involving US troops, 
Climate change and national 
security—Carl Ungerer
A number of recent reports and policy 
statements have placed global climate 
change at the centre of national security 
debates. According to these reports, climate 
change will present national security 
planners with a range of new challenges 
including: widespread political instability in 
low­lying coastal areas; increased migration 
flows from developing to developed 
countries; food and energy scarcity leading 
to greater competition for and possible 
conflict over, resources; increases in the 
scale and damage caused by natural 
disasters; and the rapid spread of infectious 
diseases across borders.
However, not all security analysts share 
that assessment. Skeptics point to the 
uncertainties and contradictions in the 
scientific modeling used by the UN’s 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change to highlight the unpredictable 
consequences of climate change. In fact, 
global climate change could produce 
‘winners’ as well as ‘losers’. Countries 
such as Canada may experience higher 
crop yields as well as less severe seasonal 
weather patterns as a result of global 
warming. Sea lanes through the Arctic 
region might open up to become more 
accessible to submarines and other ships. 
Trade might become faster, cheaper 
and easier. 
As this polling data shows, climate change 
is an issue of growing concern to many 
Australians. And the environment now 
ranks much higher than traditional security 
issues as an election issue. But whether or 
not climate change represents the most 
important external threat we face remains 
to be seen. 
Although Australians believe that climate 
change is important, there is as yet 
no consensus on the best way for the 
government to handle climate change. Is it 
a national security issue or one that should 
be addressed through social and economic 
policy settings? Should our military forces 
be reconfigured to handle natural disasters 
as their primary role? Do we need our 
warfighters to become water fighters? 
Should our intelligence agencies be looking 
for climate secrets? The polling data shows 
that environmental issues are unlikely to 
fade from public consciousness. So dealing 
with climate change will remain a core 
priority for the Australian government.
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still depended heavily on logistical support 
from the US military. Not surprisingly, the 
public has consistently viewed Australia’s 
independent defence capability as decidedly 
limited, and with the exception of the 
East Timor operation in 1999, that is clearly 
reflected in the public opinion poll trends.
There is thus general agreement among 
the public, as Figure 4 shows, that Australia 
would not be able to defend itself if attacked 
by an enemy; for most of the period since 
the late 1990s, between 1 in 4 and 1 in 5 
voters held this view. The exception to this 
general pattern is the 2000 survey, which 
was conducted just after the start of the 
highly successful Australian­led intervention 
in East Timor. The success of the mission, 
together with the absence of serious 
casualties among the military, resulted 
in an increase in the public’s confidence 
about Australia’s defence capabilities. Thus, 
the 2000 survey found that 39% of those 
interviewed believed that Australia could 
defend itself if attacked, but this dropped 
back to 20% in the 2001 survey, reverting to 
the long­term trend. 
The other part of Figure 4 shows the 
proportion of survey respondents who believe 
that defence is stronger than it was 10 years 
ago. This figure also increased in 2000, 
from 40% in 1998 to 58%, presumably also 
a consequence of the East Timor operation. 
However, the proportion holding this positive 
view about defence has remained constant 
since then, varying by around 2 percentage 
points. Thus, while the effect of the East 
Timor operation on public opinion about 
Australia’s ability to defend itself was 
temporary, the impact on opinions about 
defence being stronger than in the past has 
been more long­lasting, and shows no sign 
of declining to its pre­East Timor level. This 
may well be a consequence of the public’s 
awareness of the large capital investment in 
defence post­2000.
Ascertaining how the public views Australia’s 
defence capacity is one aspect of the public’s 
level of confidence in defence. Another aspect 
is how much funding the public wants to 
commit to defence. Measuring the level of 
funding support for defence is, of course, 
difficult, particularly if it is divorced from 
Figure 3: Defence as a general problem and as an election issue, 2007
See Figure 1 for election issue question wording. The general problem question was: ‘And still thinking about the same 
14 issues, which of these issues is the most important political problem facing Australia today?’
Source: AES 2007.
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Figure 4: Trends in opinion towards Australia’s defence capabilities, 1998–2007 (percent agree)
‘Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements. 
…Australia would be able to defend itself successfully if it were ever attacked. …Australia’s defence is stronger now 
than it was 10 years ago.’ In 1998 and 2001 a ‘neither’ category was used, which has been omitted from the estimates 
presented here.
Source: AES 1998–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.
Figure 5: Trends in opinion towards defence spending, 1975–2007 (percent)
‘Do you think that the government should spend more or spend less on defence?’ Exact question wordings vary 
between surveys conducted prior to 1987.
Source: 1975–85 McAllister and Makkai (1992); AES 1987–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.
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the other trade­offs that may be involved; 
more government funding for defence might 
mean, for example, less funding for the 
environment and so on. Nevertheless, while 
asking people to opt for more or less funding 
for defence without any explicit trade­off has 
limited utility, measuring the trend across an 
extended period does tell us much about the 
relative standing of defence in the eyes of the 
public. Fortunately, we have such data, going 
back as far as 1975 (Figure 5).
Views on defence spending—
Andrew Davies
There is no doubt a story to be told about 
the dynamics of public opinion on defence 
and security issues when major events 
occur. The impact of the 9/11 attacks and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union appears 
to be reflected in the figures we see in this 
paper. But if we take a longer term view, 
and average out the ups and downs of 
topical events, there is a long term story 
that is also interesting.
Despite a fair bit of variability from year 
to year, the data in Figure 5 shows some 
long­term trends. The graph below 
redraws it with long­term trend lines 
superimposed and now includes the sum 
of the respondents who wanted either 
more or less spent on defence—equating 
to the proportion of respondents who had 
a view on defence spending. It is clear that, 
despite many ups and downs, the overall 
trend is for fewer respondents (on average) 
to want less defence spending and fewer 
to want more, because less overall have a 
strong view either way. 
 We don’t have to look too far for a 
plausible explanation of these trends. 
Figure 6 shows the percentage of 
respondents who see a security threat to 
Australia. Again there are some ups and 
downs and again there is an overall decline 
over time. The correlation between the 
number of respondents with a view on 
defence spending and those who see a 
security threat to Australia is over 80%.
Views on defence spending
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The 1970s and 1980s represent the period 
when the Cold War dominated the 
international political environment and, 
not surprisingly, support for increased 
defence spending peaked at 77% in 1981. This 
followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in December 1979 and the resulting boycott 
by some countries of the 1980 Summer 
Olympics in Moscow. From then onwards, 
support for more defence spending declined, 
bottoming at 33% in 1990 with the collapse 
of communism and the end of the Cold War; 
this was a period when defence appeared 
to have less relevance for the public. The 
year 1990 is also notable as the only point at 
which those supporting less spending actually 
outnumbered those favouring more spending. 
Support for defence again rose after the 1991 
Gulf War, once more reaching Cold War levels 
in 2000 and 2001, after East Timor and the 
9/11 attacks. Since 2000, support for defence 
spending has declined consistently at each 
federal election, most recently standing at 
47% in 2007. 
Public opinion towards perceptions of 
Australia’s defence capabilities is driven in 
part by elite discussion and debate about 
defence issues, and in part by international 
events. With the exception of the Iraq war, 
there has generally been little elite debate 
about defence, so increased defence spending 
in the 1990s and early 2000s received general 
and largely unquestioning public support. 
The East Timor crisis in 1999, and the 9/11 
attacks shortly afterwards, generated public 
support for the view that Australia’s defence 
was stronger than in the past, although still 
remaining contingent on support from the 
United States. However, party differences 
over Iraq and the absence of any major 
international events on the scale of 9/11 or 
the Iraq war have led to a decrease in public 
support for increased defence spending.
Security threats
In general, the public’s perception of the level 
of threat that exists to Australia is directly 
proportional to the degree of instability in 
the international environment, and to the 
number of countries that might potentially 
be considered a threat. With several notable 
exceptions, all linked to major international 
events, the long­term trend suggests a 
steady decline in the public’s perception of 
a direct security threat to Australia. That 
decline is consistent with threats from 
countries—notably China and Russia—being 
gradually replaced in the public’s view by 
threats from terrorist and other transnational 
risks and pressures. 
At the beginning of the period for which 
we have survey data, starting in 1975, 
Figure 6 shows that around one half of 
those interviewed believed that there was 
a security threat of some description to 
Australia. By contrast, for the period since 
1996, the proportion seeing a threat has 
remained consistently lower, at around 1 in 3 
of those interviewed. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in a peak of 63%, 
the highest figure recorded during the period 
of the surveys, and the lowest figure of 33% 
occurs in the most recent survey, in 2007. The 
end of the Cold War in 1990, the collapse of 
communism, and the effective neutralisation 
of Russia as a military power, have also 
contributed to a public belief that there are 
fewer threats to Australian security from 
countries than there once was.
The public’s changing views of China and 
Indonesia as security threats reflect many 
of the other changes in public opinion that 
have taken place during the period. In 1967, 
China, with its support for North Vietnam in 
the Vietnam War, was seen as a major threat 
to Australia and was mentioned by 31% of 
the survey respondents. By contrast, just 7% 
mentioned Indonesia as a potential threat. 
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During the course of the next 40 years that 
situation has almost exactly reversed, and in 
2007, 28% viewed Indonesia as a threat, but 
just 10% took the same view of China. The 
public’s concern about China declined rapidly 
after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, 
and was rekindled briefly during the 1990s 
following the Tiananmen Square massacre of 
1989. Concern about Indonesia has increased 
almost incrementally over the period, with 
just a slight decline in the late 1980s. Public 
concern peaked in 2001, following the events 
in East Timor and has remained high since, 
albeit with a slight decline. See Figure 7.
Both Japan and Vietnam have been viewed 
as low­level threats to Australia. At only 
2 points since the late 1960s has Japan been 
mentioned as a threat by more than 10% of 
respondents. That occurred in 1989 and 1996; 
the first appears to be linked to the death of 
Emperor Hirohito which raised memories and 
publicity concerning Japan’s wartime history.2 
Vietnam has also been rarely mentioned as 
a possible threat, with the partial exception 
of the late 1960s, which, not surprisingly, 
occurred during the Vietnam War. In 1968, for 
example, following the highly publicised Tet 
offensive in South Vietnam, 14% of the survey 
respondents mentioned Vietnam as a threat. 
In 2007, just 4% of those interviewed thought 
Vietnam or Japan represented a security 
threat to Australia. See Figure 8.
The public’s view of the threat posed by 
several other countries is worth noting. 
During the Cold War, the surveys routinely 
asked about the threat posed by Russia, and 
Figure 9 shows that significant proportions 
of respondents saw Russia as a threat. This 
concern peaked in 1980 at 40%, following 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 
1979. By 1989, however, with the collapse 
of communism and economic weakness 
undermining Russia’s military capacity, few 
mentioned Russia as a threat. The last survey 
Figure 6: Perceptions of a security threat to Australia, 1969–2007 (percent)
1990–2007: ‘In your opinion, are any of the following countries likely to pose a threat to Australia’s security?’ Estimates 
are based on respondents who answered ‘very likely’ to at least one of the countries listed in each survey. 1969–88: 
Exact question wordings and codings vary between surveys.
Source: 1969–85 McAllister and Makkai (1992); AES 1987–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.
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Figure 7: Indonesia and China as security threats to Australia, 1967–2007 (percent)
1990–2007: ‘In your opinion, are any of the following countries likely to pose a threat to Australia’s security?’ 
1967–88: Exact question wordings and codings vary between surveys.
Source: 1969–85 McAllister and Makkai (1992); AES 1987–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.
Figure 8: Japan and Vietnam as security threats to Australia, 1967–2007 (percent)
1990–2007: ‘In your opinion, are any of the following countries likely to pose a threat to Australia’s security?’ 
1967–88: Exact question wordings and codings vary between surveys.
Source: 1969–85 McAllister and Makkai (1992); AES 1987–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.
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to include Russia was conducted in 2000 and 
found that just 5% mentioned it as a threat. 
Since 1996, Malaysia has been included in the 
surveys, and has attracted between 6 and 
8% of voters who see it as a threat. 
More intriguingly, while very few respondents 
have mentioned the United States as a 
potential threat to Australia, the proportion 
reached 6% in 2004. This remains a small 
minority but nevertheless represents a 
threefold increase on 2001, so it is too large 
an increase to represent sampling error in the 
surveys. The explanation seems to have been 
the unpopularity of the bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the United States, 
which was ratified in August 2004.3 The 
unpopularity of the Iraq war appears to have 
been another contributing factor; in 2007, 
77% of the respondents thought that the 
Iraq war had not been worth the cost, but 
this increased to 97% among those who felt 
that the United States was a security threat 
to Australia.4 Clearly, the rise in the numbers 
seeing the US as a threat is motivated less 
by the belief that the US harbours military 
ambitions towards Australia and more 
by anti­American sentiment, fostered by 
disenchantment with the FTA, and opposition 
to the Iraq war.
Public opinion about the level of threat to 
Australia and about the source of those 
threats is important: they help to shape the 
broad parameters of foreign and defence 
policy. For example, those who see more 
National security budget—
Carl Ungerer
The Commonwealth Budget for 2008–09 
contained $349.4 million in new spending 
initiatives on national security and 
$66.3 million in savings by cancelling or 
slowing previously announced government 
initiatives. This is the smallest increase in 
national security spending since 2002–03. It 
brings to a total more than $8 billion spent 
on national security since 2001.
New funding initiatives include: 
• $429 million to extend Australia’s 
military involvement in Afghanistan
• $166 million over two years to extend 
Australia’s military presence in 
East Timor
• $191 million over five years to increase by 
500 the number of Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) officers
• $75 million over four years for AFP 
assistance to the Pacific Islands, 
including in Samoa, Nauru and 
Papua New Guinea
• $6.8 million over two years to increase 
Australia’s intelligence capability
• $5 million over five years to establish 
an Office of National Security in the 
Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet.
A number of former Howard government 
initiatives on national security have been 
cut or downgraded. These include:
• $16.2 million withdrawn from planned 
growth in AFP funding including the 
airport liaison officer network, the 
International Deployment Group, a 
domestic surge capacity and regional 
rapid deployment teams.
• $50 million redirected from the National 
Community Crime Prevention Program 
towards the government’s new Safer 
Suburbs Program. 
• $7.1 million over four years to reduce 
overseas representation by the Office of 
Transport Security. 
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threats existing are more likely to view 
the ANZUS alliance with the US as more 
important than those who see fewer or no 
threats. Similarly, those who see more threats 
to Australia within the region are likely to 
have specific views about the direction of 
defence policy, and in particular are more 
likely to support increased defence spending. 
In 2007 only 10% of the respondents who 
did not see a threat to Australia supported 
spending much more on defence; by contrast, 
46% of those who saw four or more threats 
to Australia wanted much more spent 
on defence. 5 
Defence and the United States
Since the Second World War, the alliance 
with the United States has represented the 
cornerstone of Australia’s defence policy 
and for the US, represents one of its most 
important defence arrangements in the 
Asia Pacific (Tow and Albinski, 2002). In formal 
terms, the Australia, New Zealand, United 
States Security Treaty (ANZUS) commits 
the signatories to providing assistance in 
the event of an attack on any one of them. 
The treaty was invoked for the first time by 
Australia following the 9/11 attacks—the 
fiftieth anniversary year of its signing.  As a 
consequence of the treaty’s longevity, the 
well­publicised annual AusMin meetings 
that take place between Australian and US 
officials, and not least the cultural factors 
that underpin it, the ANZUS Treaty is perhaps 
one of the best recognised and understood 
aspects of postwar Australian defence policy.
The public’s trust in the United States to 
come to Australia’s defence fluctuates 
with perceptions of instability within the 
international environment, and with the 
demonstrated willingness of US leaders to 
commit their military forces to overseas 
Figure 9: Malaysia, Russia and the United States as security threats to Australia, 1967–2007 
(percent)
1990–2007: ‘In your opinion, are any of the following countries likely to pose a threat to Australia’s security?’ 
1967–88: Exact question wordings and codings vary between surveys.
Source: 1969–85 McAllister and Makkai (1992); AES 1987–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.
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conflicts. Thus Figure 10 shows that there are 
peaks in public support for the US at the time 
of the first Gulf War in 1991, and following the 
9/11 attacks, when it became apparent that 
the US response would be to mount a military 
invasion of Afghanistan. Popular trust in the 
US was lowest in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the 
withdrawal of US military forces from many 
bases across the world, particularly in Europe. 
Another factor influencing public opinion 
at this time may have been the East Timor 
crisis, when the US ruled out direct military 
involvement; the 2000 survey shows the 
lowest level of trust over the entire period of 
the surveys.
Nevertheless, despite these fluctuations 
in the public’s trust in the US to come to 
Australia’s defence, Figure 10 shows a high 
and generally consistent level of trust. For 
most of the 37 year period for which surveys 
are available, those expressing trust in the US 
have outnumbered those taking a negative 
view, often by a ratio of 2 to 1; the exception is 
the 1989 to 1993 period. Trust was particularly 
high after the 9/11 attacks, peaking at 39%, 
the second highest figure in the whole period; 
it has gradually declined since then, to 31% 
in 2007. 
There has also been strong public support for 
the ANZUS alliance with the US, with again 
the peak in support occurring immediately 
after the 9/11 attacks, when nearly 6 out of 
10 respondents said that the alliance was 
‘very important’ for Australia’s security. And 
once again, the lowest point comes at the 
time of the East Timor crisis, most likely for 
the reasons already mentioned. However, 
even here, those saying that the alliance 
was ‘not very important’ are outnumbered 
more than three to one by those saying that 
it is ‘very important.’ See Figure 11. By any 
standards, then, there is strong and consistent 
Figure 10: Trust in the US to defend Australia, 1970–2007 (percent)
‘If Australia’s security were threatened by some other country, how much trust do you feel Australia can have in the 
United States to come to Australia’s defence?’ Exact question wordings and codings vary between surveys prior 
to 1987.
Source: US Information Service; Survey of Defence Issues 2000; AES 1987–2007.
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public support for the ANZUS alliance as a 
cornerstone of Australia’s defence policy.  
There have, however, been recent declines in 
public support for the US, following the high 
point recorded after the 9/11 attacks. There 
are three explanations for this decline. One 
explanation has already been mentioned: 
the unpopularity of the FTA with the US, and 
the view that the US was posing a threat 
to Australia’s economic security, albeit a 
view held by a small minority of voters. A 
second, more important explanation is the 
unpopularity of the Iraq war. Reflecting 
patterns of public opinion in the US, there 
was widespread public support in 2003 for 
the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of 
the Saddam Hussein regime; however, as 
the insurgency against the coalition forces 
gathered pace and casualties have mounted, 
the public has become less supportive of 
the way in which the occupation of Iraq has 
been conducted.
In 2004, just after the invasion of Iraq, Table 2 
shows that there was a small majority of 
Australians—52%—in favour of the Iraq 
war.6 However, by 2007 a majority, 55%, 
disapproved of the war, and those feeling 
most strongly in support of the war declined 
from 17 to 8%. There are similar declines in the 
proportions who see the war as being worth 
the cost; in 2004 only 39% viewed the war 
as worth the cost, but by 2004 just one in 
every four took this view, a significant decline. 
The only comfort from these figures is that 
the public’s view that the threat of terrorism 
had increased as a result of the war actually 
dropped, from 68 to 56%. However, virtually 
no­one believed in either survey that the war 
had decreased the threat of terrorism, a key 
goal of the original invasion.7
To what extent has the increasing 
unpopularity of the US­led Iraq war harmed 
public support for the ANZUS alliance? Views 
of the Iraq war are strongly correlated with 
Figure 11: The importance of the ANZUS alliance, 1993–2007 (percent)
‘How important do you think the Australian alliance with the United States under the ANZUS treaty is for protecting 
Australia’s security?’
Source: AES 1993–2007; Survey of Defence Issues 2000.
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views about the ANZUS alliance. In 2004, 
the correlation between views of the Iraq 
war and support for the ANZUS alliance was 
.553 (p<.000), and .455 (p<.000) in 2007. The 
evidence suggests that the Iraq war has 
influenced views about ANZUS, but that the 
impact of opinions about Iraq has declined, 
albeit marginally. Following the withdrawal of 
Australian troops from an active combat role 
in Iraq, it’s expected that the effect of Iraq 
on opinions about ANZUS, already small, will 
decline further.
The third explanation for the decline in 
support for ANZUS is generational: those who 
most value the defence link with the US are 
those who most remember and have direct 
experience of Australia’s dependence on the 
US during the Second World War. Figure 12 
shows the strong influence of generational 
differences on support for ANZUS. Those aged 
80 or more, whose earliest political memories 
would have been shaped by the Second 
World War and its aftermath, are no less 
than four times more likely to see the ANZUS 
alliance as being very important, compared to 
those aged 18 to 24, whose earliest political 
memories would have been in the 1990s, 
after the end of the Cold War. These are major 
differences, and they suggest that as the 
older generations move out of the population, 
support for the defence link with the US will, 
ceteris paribus, decline, subjecting the alliance 
to more critical scrutiny (Beeson, 2003).
One final aspect of defence links with the 
US is worthy of note: public support for the 
US­initiated War on Terror. The War on Terror 
Table 2: Support for the Iraq war, 2004–07
2004 2007 (Change 2001–07)
Approve of Iraq War
Strongly approve 17 8 (–9)
Approve 35 37 (+2)
Disapprove 18 31 (+13)
Strongly disapprove 30 24 (–6)
Total 100 100
(N) (1,728) (1,839)
War Worth the Cost
Worth it 39 24 (–15)
Not worth it 61 76 (+15)
Total 100 100
(N) (1,704) (1,827)
Threat of Terrorism
Increased 68 56 (–12)
Stayed the same 31 42 (+11)
Decreased 1 2 (+1)
Total 100 100
(N) (1,730) (1,846)
‘Now we want to ask you about the current war in Iraq. Do you approve or disapprove of the way John Howard 
handled the war in Iraq?’ ‘Taking everything into account, do you think the war in Iraq has been worth the cost or not?’ 
‘As a result of Australia’s military action in Iraq, do you think the threat of terrorism against Australia has increased, 
decreased, or stayed about the same?’
Source: AES 2004–07.
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was introduced after the 9/11 attacks as an 
umbrella policy to undermine the activities of 
terrorist groups operating across the world. 
Its first manifestation was the invasion of 
Afghanistan in October 2001, followed by 
the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, both of 
which involved US­led military coalitions. 
In November 2001, over two out of every 
three voters supported the provision of 
Australian military assistance to the War on 
Terror (Table 3); overall, supporters of military 
assistance outnumbered opponents by more 
ANZUS and generational 
change—Rod Lyon
The polling results raise the possibility that 
intergenerational differences may result in 
a ‘gradual, secular decline in public support 
for defence links with the United States.’ 
Such a decline is certainly possible: the 
young tend to evince lower levels of 
support for the ANZUS alliance than the 
old. And the most loyal demographic in 
the research, the over­80s, are those most 
likely to die off. Polities change, and so do 
their opinions. There is no law of physics 
which insists that Australia will always 
find itself linked to the United States in 
defence matters. 
But we need to shade this possibility with 
a few caveats. First, research about ANZUS 
has previously shown a variation in alliance 
support in relation to age. The previous 
2004 ASPI report, Attitude Matters, 
addressed this point specifically, using data 
from the 2001 AES survey to show a similar 
pattern of intergenerational change in 
levels of support for the alliance.
Overlaying the data from the two surveys 
(2001 and 2007) shows a substantial 
weakening of support for ANZUS across 
all age brackets. For obvious reasons, 2001 
was a high­water mark in relation to levels 
of support for ANZUS in the post­Cold 
War era. But the gradient of the 2007 
graph is only a little steeper across the 
age­brackets than the gradient of the 2001 
graph, and that is the actual indicator of 
intergenerational difference. 
Second, the world is not a steady­state 
entity. Threats come and go, wars start 
and finish.  Since the signing of ANZUS in 
1951, Australians have fought alongside 
Americans in Korea, Vietnam, the first Gulf 
War, Afghanistan and Iraq, and some might 
want to add to those both the Cold War 
and the current War on Terror.  The world 
remains a dangerous place. We can’t yet 
tell what the future holds, but it would 
be a surprise if it did not contain at least 
some events that might serve as catalysts 
for the renewal of ANZUS. One of the 
features of both this latest research and 
the earlier studies is that events such as 
September 2001 are critical in renewing a 
sense of the alliance’s importance amongst 
the Australian public. True, some events 
may also erode public support. 
Third, an alliance is an option that both the 
Australian public and Australian strategic 
planners need to see in context. If we 
gradually slip away from our defence 
links with the United States, then what 
takes the place of those links? Even in 
2007 only 23% of Australians believed that 
Australia could defend itself if attacked. 
Against that figure, the current number of 
Australians who say that ANZUS is ‘very 
important’ to Australia’s security—42%—is 
especially revealing about the relative 
weightings that Australians place on the 
choice between alliance and self­reliance. 
Australians have never gone to war alone. 
And they show no interest in doing so in 
this latest survey.
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than 5 to 1. By 2007 support had declined to 
52%, with 21% opposing military assistance. 
Nevertheless, it would appear that the War on 
Terror has retained strong support despite the 
increasing unpopularity of the Iraq war.
There are consistently high levels of public 
trust in the US and support for the ANZUS 
alliance. Two recent events—the unpopularity 
of the FTA and the Iraq war—have resulted 
in a slight decline in public support for the 
US. But judged against the sweep of four 
decades, the decline is small. More serious are 
the intergenerational differences in support 
for the defence link with the US. Continued 
unabated, it suggests a gradual decline in 
public support for defence links with the US 
which is unrelated to major international 
political events.
Figure 12: Generational differences in support for the ANZUS Alliance  
(percent say ‘very important’)
Source: AES 2007.
Table 3: Support for the War on Terrorism, 2001–07
2001 2004 2007 (Change 2001–07)
Strongly agree 20 14 12 (–8)
Agree 48 44 40 (–8)
Neither 19 22 27 (+8)
Disagree 8 14 14 (+6)
Strongly disagree 5 6 7 (+2)
Total 100 100 100
(N) (1,953) (1,717) (1,834)
‘Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements. 
… Australia should provide military assistance for the war on terrorism.’
Source: AES 2001–07.
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terrorism
In comparison with the other Western 
democracies, Australia has been relatively 
immune from a major terrorist attack. 
Such incidents that have occurred have 
generally been small­scale, isolated, and 
for the most part have involved attacks 
on foreign diplomats by groups concerned 
with grievances in their home countries.8 By 
contrast, Britain endured a major terrorist 
campaign by the Irish Republican Army from 
the early 1970s up until 1998, and the US 
experienced the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing, which killed 6 people, and the 
9/11 attacks, which killed 2,998 people.9 
The Australian public’s isolation from 
terrorism ended with the Bali bombings on 
12 October 2002, which killed 202 people, 
88 of them Australian. 
The 2007 AES found that most people now 
believe that the risk of terrorism occurring in 
Australia is part of everyday life. When asked 
to agree or disagree with the statement that 
‘Acts of terrorism in Australia will be part 
of life in the future’, no fewer than 62% of 
respondents agreed with the proposition, 
and just 14% disagreed; 24% took no position. 
These figures are very close to those found 
in the US, where a December 2006 poll 
found that 70% believed that ‘terrorism 
in the US will be part of life in the future’, 
24% disagreed, and 6% were unsure.10 The 
main difference is the larger proportion of 
Australian respondents who offered no view 
on the issue. 
Since the late 1970s, successive governments 
have revised the legislation and agencies 
responsible for counter­terrorism. Following 
9/11 and the Bali bombings, specific legislation 
was introduced to detain terrorist suspects 
for longer periods of time and to proscribe 
organisations considered to be engaged in 
terrorism. The various measures introduced 
by the government to deal with terrorism, 
coupled with the absence of any major attack 
on Australian soil, have clearly resonated 
with the public, who generally approve of 
the government’s handling of the problem. 
Figure 13 shows that just over half of the 
survey respondents in 2007 believed that 
the government was ‘doing all it can’ to deal 
with problem, with 39% believing that the 
government ‘could do more’. Just 1 in 10 took 
the view that the government had done too 
much. Once again, these figures are very 
similar to public opinion in the US, where 
around a half of voters approve of their 
government’s response to terrorism.11
To what extent is the public concerned about 
terrorism, both as a threat to themselves 
personally and as a national threat to the 
country? Table 4 shows that the respondents 
in 2007 divided equally between those 
expressing some personal concern about 
becoming a victim of terrorism, and those 
who were not concerned. Indeed, even the 
strength of the opposing opinions were 
almost the same. However, those concerned 
about a major attack occurring in Australia 
outnumbered those who were not concerned 
by about 2 to 1. Personal and national concerns 
about terrorism are, of course, closely related. 
And once again, these figures are very similar 
to those found in recent US surveys about the 
public’s fear of terrorism. For example, in a 
June 2006 Gallup survey, 12% said they were 
‘very worried’ that they or someone in their 
family would be a victim of a terrorist attack, 
while 32% were ‘somewhat worried.’12
The response of governments around the 
world to terrorism has been to introduce legal 
measures curtailing individual rights and 
freedoms. In Britain, the government passed 
emergency legislation after 9/11 allowing 
for the detention without trial of terrorist 
suspects if they could not be deported. 
Subsequent legislation passed after the 
July 2005 London train bombings created new 
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offences related to terrorism, and permitted 
the holding of suspects for 28 days (although 
the government had initially sought up to 
90 days). In the US, the 2001 ‘Patriot’ Act 
increased the powers of the security agencies 
to investigate terrorist suspects, including the 
power to intercept computer and telephone 
conversations, and to access financial and 
other personal records. Australia’s response 
has been to introduce legislation at both 
state and federal levels, including more 
wide­ranging powers to detain and question 
suspects, and to intercept communications 
(Golder and Williams 2006; O’Neil, 2007).
The response has been strong public 
support for these measures. Table 5 shows 
that a majority—57%—agreed that groups 
sympathetic to terrorism should not enjoy 
freedom of speech, compared to just 23% 
who disagreed with the measure. There is 
Figure 13: Government’s handling of threat from terrorism
‘Do you think that the government is doing all it reasonably can do to prevent terrorist attacks in Australia, do you 
think that it could do more, or do you think that it has done too much?’
Source: AES 2007.
Table 4: The public’s fear of terrorism
Concerned about…
Becoming terror victim Major attack in future
Very concerned 14 17
Somewhat concerned 36 49
Not very concerned 38 27
Not at all concerned 12 7
Total 100 100
(N) (1,847) (1,846)
‘How concerned are you personally about you yourself or a family member being the victim of a future terrorist 
attack in Australia?’ ‘And how concerned are you that there will be a major terrorist attack on Australian soil in the 
near future?’
Source: AES 2007.
 Special Report
Table 5: The rights of terrorist sympathisers
For terrorist sympathisers…
Limit freedom of speech Search houses without warrant
Strongly agree 26 16
Agree 31 49
Neither 20 29
Disagree 16 5
Strongly disagree 7 1
Total 100 100
(N) (1,816) (1,813)
‘Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements… 
…Freedom of speech should not extend to groups that are sympathetic to terrorists. …The police should be allowed to 
search the houses of people who might be sympathetic to terrorists without a court order’
Source: AES 2007.
Table 6: Fear of terrorism and support for stronger legal measures
(Regression coefficients)
Partial Standardised
Beliefs about terrorism
Fears being victim of terrorism .149* .107*
Concern about terrorist attack .181* .121*
Government doing all it can .160* .087*
Controls
Age .005* .063*
Gender (male) –.003 –.001
Urban .052 .050
Tertiary education –.224* –.083*
Constant 1.478
Adj R-sq .08
(N) (1,817)
* statistically significant at p<.01.
Ordinary least squares regression analysis showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) regression coefficient 
predicting support for limiting terrorist sympathisers’ freedom of speech, measured on a five point scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. Fears being victim and concern about attack are scored from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree, and government doing all it can on a three point scale from doing too much to doing all it can. 
Age is scored in years, gender and tertiary education are scored zero to 1, and urban is a four point scale from rural to 
inner metro.
Source: AES 2007.
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stronger support for searching the houses of 
people sympathetic to terrorists without a 
court order; 65% agreed with this proposition, 
compared to just 6% who disagreed. Also 
notable is the relatively large proportion (20% 
on freedom of speech, and 29% on searching 
houses without a warrant) who expressed 
no view either way. By any standards, the 
government’s anti­terrorism legislation 
has strong public support. Moreover, 
comparisons with US public opinion shows 
that the Australian public is more supportive 
of restricting the legal rights of terrorist 
sympathisers than their US counterparts.13
Are the public’s views about restricting the 
rights and freedoms for terrorist sympathisers 
driven by personal fear of being a victim of 
terrorism, or by concern about an attack 
on the country? Studies of the impact of 
fear of terrorism on public opinion have 
largely replicated the findings of the fear of 
crime research. These studies have found 
that personal fear has a limited impact on 
evaluations of public policy; by contrast, it is 
concerns about the national terrorist threat 
that have a stronger impact on opinions 
(Huddy et al, 2002; Joslyn and Haider­Markel, 
2007).  Table 6 tests this proposition by 
examining the factors that predict support 
Countering terrorism—
Carl Ungerer
After several years of jihadist terrorist 
attacks on Western populations from Bali 
to London, Australians have become more 
accustomed to the threat of international 
terrorism. Although Australia has not 
suffered directly from a terrorist bombing in 
over 30 years, the survey shows that most 
Australians now accept the proposition that 
terrorism is a part of everyday life. 
The absence of a terrorist attack on 
Australian soil, however, has not softened 
the public’s attitude towards stricter 
counter­terrorism measures. Over forty 
pieces of legislation have been passed by 
Federal Parliament since 2001, increasing 
the powers of domestic security and 
law enforcement agencies to conduct 
counter­terrorism operations and restricting 
the legal rights of terrorism suspects. 
Only half (51%) of the respondents to the 
2007 survey believed that the government 
was doing all it could to prevent terrorist 
attacks in Australia. Nearly 40% believe that 
the government should do more.
Contradictory forces are at play here. The 
Rudd Labor government has signaled 
that it will slow or contract some of the 
major national security funding initiatives 
of the previous government, including 
several related to the counter­terrorism 
operations of the Australian Federal Police. 
At the same time, the government is 
crafting a new national security framework 
that is expected to broaden the concept 
of national security beyond a narrow 
definition of counter­terrorism. The 
resulting shift in both funding priorities 
and strategic direction is at odds with the 
community’s belief that more should be 
done to protect Australia from the threat 
of terrorism.
As the survey shows, personal concerns 
about becoming a victim of terrorism 
are closely related to broader concerns 
about the national threat. Should 
terrorists succeed in conducting a major 
bombing at a metropolitan centre in 
Australia, the public’s demand for further 
counter­terrorism measures is likely 
to exceed the government’s ability to 
supply them.
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for limiting terrorist sympathiser’s freedom 
of speech. The independent variables 
are the three measures of beliefs about 
terrorism already discussed, and controls 
for age, gender, urban residence and 
tertiary education.
The results confirm that it is generalised 
concerns about a national terrorist attack that 
are the most important predictor of stronger 
legal measures against terrorist suspects; the 
standardised coefficient of 0.121 shows that 
it is about twice as important as age in the 
equation. Personal concerns about being a 
victim of terrorism are of lesser importance, 
as previous research predicts, but it remains 
significant and is the second most important 
predictor in the model. Believing that the 
government is doing all it can is the third 
most important predictor. Several of the 
control variables are also significant. Those 
supporting stronger legal measures are more 
likely to be older and less likely to have tertiary 
education; there are no variations in gender, 
or geographical location.
In line with most of the advanced 
democracies, Australians have had to 
come to terms with the threat of terrorism.  
Low­probability, high risk events such as major 
terrorist attacks tend to engender significant 
changes in attitudes and behaviours among 
mass publics (Gigerenzer, 2006). These 
changes among the public are, of course, 
disproportionate to the risk of directly 
experiencing such an event. Nevertheless, 
the government can take some comfort from 
the survey results, which show that a narrow 
majority believe they are doing all they can to 
tackle the problem.
conclusion
Judged over an extended period, defence 
and national security remain second order 
issues for most voters. Nevertheless, what 
the surveys reveal is the extent to which 
terrorism now occupies centre­stage in the 
public’s perceptions of security. Half of all 
voters fear being the victim of terrorism and 
about two­thirds believe that there will be 
a major terrorist attack on Australia in the 
future and are concerned about it. In much 
the same way that the threat of terrorism is 
changing defence strategy (Dupont 2003; 
Hirst 2007), so too is the public gaining a 
new understanding of the challenges facing 
defence in the 21st century.
One part of the public’s re­evaluation of 
defence is the perception of threats within the 
region. During the 20th century these threats 
came exclusively from nation­states; today, 
with increasing economic inter­dependence 
through globalisation, only Indonesia is 
regarded as a threat by any significant 
proportion of Australians, and even those 
figures have shown a decline since the high 
point of 2001, following the East Timor crisis. 
There is also some evidence that some voters 
are interpreting security in economic terms, 
notably with the rise in the small proportion 
seeing the United States as a threat to 
Australia’s security.
Another part of the public’s re­evaluation 
of defence and security is relations with 
the US. While trust in the US to come to 
Australia’s defence and support for the 
ANZUS treaty remain high, there has been 
a decline in both measures since the high 
point reached in the immediate post­9/11 
aftermath. This decline has its roots in the 
very vocal opposition directed towards the 
Australia–US Free Trade Agreement, and 
in the increasing unpopularity of the Iraq 
war. More serious for the long­term health 
of the alliance is the change that has been 
occurring through intergenerational shifts. 
These changes suggest that there may be a 
reassessment underway in how the public 
views defence relations with the US, in an era 
of global terrorism.
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Differing views about Australia’s involvement 
in the Iraq war changed the bipartisan 
consensus on defence policy that dominated 
the post­Vietnam War period. Defence is now 
a more partisan issue than at any time in the 
last 30 years. Initially, after 9/11, the end of 
bipartisanship benefited the Coalition, which 
had the advantage of incumbency and were 
seen by the public to be dealing with the 
challenges of the day. However, as Labor’s 
policy of withdrawing Australian troops from 
Iraq attracted widespread public support, 
the Coalition advantage has now largely 
dissipated. Terrorism and Iraq have changed 
the policy landscape with respect to defence 
and security, and they look likely to do the 
same for public opinion.
appendix: the Surveys
The Australian Election Study
The AES has been conducted at each federal 
election and referendum since 1987 and 
is designed to collect data on Australian 
electoral behaviour and public opinion. All but 
the 1987 and 2007 studies have been funded 
by the Australian Research Council. The AES 
routinely collects data among a nationally 
representative sample of voters. All of the 
data are publicly available from the Australian 
Social Science Data Archive at the Australian 
National University (see http://assda.anu.edu.
au). All the studies are national, post­election 
self­completion surveys with the sample 
drawn randomly from the electoral register. 
Two follow­ups have been used (three in 
1987). The overall response rates have varied 
with the most recent survey producing a 
response rate of 40.2%.
The 2000 Survey of Defence Issues
The 2000 Survey of Defence Issues was 
conducted between 13 and 20 September 
2000 by Roy Morgan Research Pty Ltd and 
funded by the Department of Defence. The 
survey used a computer assisted telephone 
interviewing system. Respondents aged 
18 years and over were randomly selected 
from all states and territories, with the 
selection of households drawn from the 
latest edition of the electronic white pages. 
In order to reduce the non­response bias, 
a minimum of three call backs were made 
to each randomly selected household, on 
different days and at different times. The 
sample was distributed across states and 
territories proportionately to the population 
with quotas set for each state and territory. 
The data are weighted using Australian 
Bureau of Statistics data so as to represent 
the national population.
Appendix table: AES response rates 1987–2007
Total sample
Moved/ 
gone away
Refusals/ 
non-responses
Valid 
responses
Effective 
response
1987 3,061 156 1,080 1,825 62.8
1990 3,606 125 1,461 2,020 58.0
1993 4,950 137 1,790 3,023 62.8
1996 3,000 95 1,110 1,795 61.8
1998 3,502 215 1,391 1,896 57.7
2001 4,000 369 1,621 2,010 55.4
2004 4,250 275 2,231 1,769 44.5
2007 5,000 337 2,790 1,873 40.2
The response rate is calculated as: valid responses/(total sample—moved or gone away).
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Endnotes
1 Other evidence to support the more 
partisan view of defence is the proportion 
of voters who do not have a view which 
party is best able to handle the issue.  In 
1996 33% of voters had no view on which 
party was best at handling defence, but in 
2007 that declined to 14%.
2 It is unclear what the 1996 rise is related 
to; one possibility is that it is associated 
with the Sarin gas attack on the Toyko 
underground in 1995.
3 The 2005 Lowy Institute Poll found that 
34% of those interviewed thought the 
FTA with the United States would be 
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good for Australia, 34% that it would 
make no difference, and 32% that it would 
be bad for Australia.  See http://www.
lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=236
4 In 2004, 30% of voters strongly 
disapproved of John Howard’s handling of 
the Iraq war, while the figure among those 
who thought the US was ‘very likely’ to be 
a security threat to Australia was 68%.
5 The correlation between the number of 
threats and seeing ANZUS as important is 
r=.08 (p<.001), while the correlation with 
more defence spending is r=0.22 (p<.001).
6 The question used in the AES survey 
mentions John Howard, so it inevitably 
encapsulates some partisan overtones.  
This wording was used in order to replicate 
a similar question in the American 
National Election Study which mentioned 
George Bush’s handling of the Iraq war. 
7 In March 2004 the Commissioner of the 
Australian Federal Police, Mick Keelty, 
was criticised by the government for 
expressing the view that terrorism had 
increased as a result of Iraq, a view also 
held, according to the 2004 AES, by 68% of 
the electorate.
8 For example, there were various attacks 
on Indian diplomats and interests by Sikhs 
in the late 1970s; in 1980 the Turkish consul 
and his bodyguard were assassinated 
by Armenians; and there have also been 
various attacks against Israeli diplomats 
and interests.  The main terrorist act on 
Australian soil was the February 1977 
bomb outside the Hilton Hotel in Sydney 
during the regional Commonwealth 
Heads of State meeting, which killed 
three people. 
9 Domestic terrorists also killed 198 people 
in the Oklahoma City bombing and killed 
five people in the 2001 anthrax attacks.
10 See http://www.pollingreport.com/ 
terror.htm
11 For example, when asked in a May 2007 
USA Today/Gallup Poll ‘Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way George W. Bush is 
handling terrorism?’, 47% approved, 50% 
disapproved, and 3% were unsure.  Other 
US polls show very similar results. See 
http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm.
12 See  http://www.pollingreport.com/ 
terror.htm  The same source cites a CBS/
NY Times poll conducted in September 
2007 which asked the question ‘How likely 
do you think it is that there will be another 
terrorist attack in the US in the next few 
months?’  The results found that 9% said 
‘very likely’, 39%  ‘somewhat likely’, 37% 
‘not very likely’, 11% ‘not at all likely’ and 4% 
were unsure.
13 In the US, the same question on limiting 
freedom of speech produced 45% 
agreement and 50% disagreement, and on 
searching houses without a warrant, 37% 
agreement and 61% disagreement. See 
http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm.
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